The U.S./Israel-Iran war has shifted back toward active confrontation following the collapse of June's fragile interim settlement. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), intended to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and create a window for further negotiations, broke down in July as repeated Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and retaliatory U.S. strikes escalated into sustained exchanges affecting countries across the region. Iran has shown it retains the capability to threaten U.S. bases, Gulf states, and commercial shipping, striking civilian and critical infrastructure in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan in an apparent effort to pressure regional governments hosting U.S. forces. On August 2, President Trump announced he had called off a planned strike, citing progress on a potential agreement to end the conflict; however, the pause remains precarious and could give way to renewed strikes with little warning.

Additionally, the threat from Iranian-backed proxy groups remains elevated and dispersed across the region. After several days of militia attacks on Saudi Arabia, launched from Iraqi territory in coordination with local militias, U.S. Central Command and Saudi forces struck Iranian-backed groups in Iraq on July 28. The threat also extends beyond the Gulf region: Houthi forces have attacked Saudi vessels in the Red Sea, and on July 29 an unclaimed drone strike hit two gas vessels at Egypt's Damietta port on the Mediterranean coast. No party has claimed the Damietta strike, and the Houthis have denied involvement, but it signals the conflict's expanded reach into energy infrastructure well outside the primary conflict zones.

Overall, travel conditions have deteriorated from the improved posture described in July. The Strait of Hormuz remains the central flashpoint, with at least a dozen ships attacked between July 6 and 22, and daily transits falling below 10. Meanwhile, the Houthi rebels’ July 20 maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia has compounded the pressure, adding Red Sea disruption to the ongoing issues in the Gulf driven by Iran’s tanker attacks. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) continues advising airlines to avoid Iranian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Qatari, Emirati, Jordanian, and Gulf of Oman airspace at all altitudes through at least August 31. Airspace closures resulting from missile barrages and U.S. military operations have driven widespread cancellations, lengthy reroutes, and terminal congestion in Israel and multiple Gulf airports, and are likely to worsen if strikes resume.

Yemen's Houthi rebels broke their four-year truce with Saudi Arabia on July 13, launching missiles and drones at Abha International Airport in retaliation for strikes on Sanaa Airport by Yemen's internationally recognized government, which is heavily backed by Saudi Arabia. The attack forced the temporary closure of four airports in southern Saudi Arabia, Abha, Jizan, Najran, and Sharurah, though Saudi air defenses intercepted the incoming missiles with no reported casualties. The Houthis have since warned airlines against overflying Saudi airspace, announced a blockade of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and launched attacks on Saudi shipping vessels in the Red Sea.

Airspace closures and missile interceptions near populated areas and airports of southwestern Saudi Arabia could recur with little warning if the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict continues to intensify, or an agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is not reached. Given the pattern of escalation over the past several weeks, further disruptions to Saudi airspace remains possible through August.

Organized crime remained a significant security concern in parts of Israel during July, particularly within segments of the Arab community where rival clans and criminal organizations continue to engage in violent disputes. Criminal groups have increasingly used car bombings and IEDs during daylight attacks in dense urban areas and have expanded their arsenals to include grenade launchers and drones, prompting ongoing law enforcement operations and public concern regarding violence in city centers.

Although such incidents are generally targeted and concentrated within specific communities, they occasionally occur in commercial districts, public spaces, and areas frequented by visitors, including in cities like Jaffa and Haifa. Travelers are unlikely to be directly targeted but may face incidental exposure to security incidents, localized disruptions, or increased police activity if violence occurs near hotels, transportation routes, or entertainment districts.

On July 21, President Trump announced that he had directed the resumption of U.S. commercial flights to Lebanon for the first time in 41 years, following a meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. Direct flights were suspended in 1985 after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.

While the announcement marks a significant policy shift, no U.S. carrier has yet published a Beirut route or schedule until a security certification of Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport is complete. Though the increase in air connectivity is expected to support tourism and business travel, travelers should remain aware that Lebanon faces ongoing infrastructure challenges, periodic security incidents, and an active conflict between terror group Hezbollah and Israel. The U.S. Department of State’s travel advisory categorizes Lebanon at Level 4: Do Not Travel, meaning the policy change has not yet translated into any change in the underlying security guidance for travelers.